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THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS  Vol. 18, No. 1 (Spring 2017) 
OF GREAT USE AND INTEREST: CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNANCE AND JUDICIAL POWER—THE 
HISTORY OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT*
Donald Warner** 
I. INTRODUCTION
Published under the auspices of the California Supreme 
Court Historical Society, this is a substantial and valuable effort 
by six authors (one of whom is also the editor) to provide a 
comprehensive history of the first 160 years—from 1850 
through 2010—of the California Supreme Court. This Court has 
been, at times, among the most influential of the state courts of 
last resort,1 which would make almost any treatment of its 
history interesting to at least a few readers. Fortunately for every 
reader of The Journal, this book offers more than the superficial 
information that one might expect in the typical commemorative 
volume. It is, on the whole, a valuable contribution to the 
literature of American legal history. 
The book will be of great use and interest to several groups 
of potential readers: jurists, especially those in the twenty-plus 
states that provide for legislation by ballot initiative; California 
lawyers;2 appellate lawyers from every state, but again 
* Harry N. Scheiber ed., 2016 [hereinafter GOVERNANCE AND POWER]. 
**Donald Warner, a member of the California Bar, has been an Adjunct Professor at 
Loyola Law School—Los Angeles. 
1. See, e.g., Peter Kay Westen, Note, The Supreme Court of California 1966–1967: 
Introduction, 55 Cal. L. Rev. 1059, 1059 & n.1 (1967) (pointing out that Time magazine 
had in the mid-1960s referred to the California Supreme Court as “the nation’s most 
aggressive and progressive state court” and quoting then-Chief Justice Earl Warren, who 
once observed that the California Supreme Court handled “a wider range of litigation than 
is to be found in most other States”). 
2. This applies primarily to the last two thirds of the book, which covers the Court from 
1964 on. 
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particularly those in the initiative states; and teachers and 
students of American legal history. 
The text is divided into seven chapters, each covering a 
separate period in the history of the Court. The time periods 
covered in each chapter are generally (but not always, as 
described below) well chosen.
II. THE COURT’S 160-YEAR HISTORY IN SEVEN CHAPTERS
A. Chapter One: 1849–1879 
This chapter begins with the establishment of the Court and 
of the State government, starting at the time of the first 
Constitution, which was negotiated and ratified in the full heat 
of the gold rush. It continues with the story of a series of three- 
Justice Courts whose membership changed almost annually. 
Through the actions of those Courts, the judiciary sorted itself 
out in the wake of the tremendous effects of the gold rush. 
Meanwhile the rest of the government, as well as civil society as 
a whole, was doing the same thing. Several of these early 
Justices were men for whom the label rough-and-tumble would 
be, if anything, an understatement. As one (admittedly extreme) 
example, take David S. Terry, an early Chief Justice, who in the 
course of a long career as lawyer and jurist: (1) was imprisoned 
and tried for attempted murder by the San Francisco Vigilance 
Committee; (2) killed a sitting United States Senator in a duel; 
and (3) was himself killed by a United States Marshal who was 
acting as the bodyguard for Justice Stephen Field of the United 
States Supreme Court.3 After chronicling the work of the Court 
during its earliest years, the chapter ends with the passage of the 
state’s second—and present—Constitution. 
B. Chapter Two: 1880–1910 
The last part of the nineteenth century was in California a 
time of huge political turmoil that was reflected in the work of 
the Court. Depending on one’s outlook, any one of a panoply of 
villains can be deemed responsible for that upheaval and 
3. GOVERNANCE AND POWER, supra note *, at 24. 
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instability: Chinese laborers and launderers, too-dominant 
railroads, demagogic politicians, or polluting hydraulic mining 
companies. Whatever its cause, almost all of that turmoil 
seemed to make its way to the Court. In this period the legal 
issues surrounding the State’s most valuable resource, water, 
emerged in litigation before the Court—and they have never 
left.4
C. Chapter Three: 1910–1940 
The progressive revolution of the 1910s hit California as 
hard as it did anywhere, and brought with it the ballot initiative, 
a magic bullet or a poison pill, depending on one’s viewpoint. 
Wherever the reader comes down on that question, the Court has 
had to wrestle with the initiative during term after term, 
throughout the century-plus since its first appearance in the 
state.5 This chapter also covers the Great Depression, which 
began the process of the slow grinding down of the Court’s 
traditional conservative stance.6 The California variant of this 
trend would culminate decades later in the so-called liberal 
Courts covered in Chapters Four and Five. 
4. See, e.g., Cal. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 247 P.3d 112 
(Cal. 2011) (involving fees on appropriative water rights); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. 
Ct., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (involving proposed diversion of lake water). 
5. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 78–101 (Cal. 2009) (surveying the history of the 
California Supreme Court’s initiative-review process), abrogated on other grounds,
Obergefell v. Hodges, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); see also, e.g., Perry v. Brown, 
265 P.3d 1002, 1145 n.16 (Cal. 2011) (characterizing as “well established” the principle 
that “California courts have an obligation to liberally construe the provisions of the 
California Constitution relating to the initiative power to assure that the initiative process is 
not directly or indirectly annulled”). Readers interested in learning more about the initiative 
process in California might consult any of the myriad scholarly works summarizing the 
history of its various aspects. See generally, e.g., Gerald F. Uelman, Review of Initiatives 
by the California Supreme Court, 2000–2010, 44 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 659 (2011); see 
also, e.g., Gerald F. Uelman, Handling Hot Potatoes: Judicial Review of California 
Initiatives after Senate v. Jones, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 999, 999–1004 (2001). 
6. This process was going on in the United States Supreme Court as well, during battles 
over the constitutionality of the various measures of Roosevelt’s New Deal. Compare, e.g.,
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding provisions 
of National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional as attempts to delegate legislative 
power to President and to regulate both intrastate commerce and local matters that had only 
an indirect connection to interstate commerce), with, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 
(1942) (upholding provisions of Agricultural Adjustment Act covering local actions 
deemed to affect intrastate commerce). 
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D. Chapter Four: 1940–1964 
In the year 1940, the elevation of a new Chief Justice, Phil 
S. Gibson, was followed quickly by the appointment to his 
vacated Associate Justice seat of a University of California– 
Berkeley law professor, Roger Traynor. Their appointments 
jump-started a period of thirty years when the Court, under the 
leadership of these two men, became the intellectual and liberal 
bellwether of the state courts of last resort. In the area of tort 
law, California Supreme Court opinions under Gibson and 
Traynor established new rules for negligence,7 charitable 
immunity,8 emotional distress,9 and products liability10 that were 
often followed in other states. The Gibson Court prefigured the 
United States Supreme Court’s Shelley v. Kraemer11 decision 
about restrictive covenants,12 and held the State’s anti-
miscegenation laws to be in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,13 nineteen years before the United States Supreme 
Court decided Loving v. Virginia.14 It was out in front in 
7. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Gibson, C.J.) 
(holding that plaintiff could rely on res ipsa loquitur to indicate negligence); see also id. at 
440–44 (Traynor, J., concurring) (outlining theory of strict liability). 
8. Malloy v. Fong, 232 P.2d 241, 247 (Cal. 1951) (Traynor, J.) (holding that “charitable 
corporations are liable for their torts whether or not a particular plaintiff has paid for the 
charity received”). 
9. State Rubbish Collectors Ass’n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952) (Traynor, J.) 
(discarding physical-injury requirement in case involving threats and intimidation that 
amounted to intentional infliction of emotional distress); see also Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 
912 (Cal. 1968) (recognizing negligent infliction of emotional distress). 
  10. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Co., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963) (recognizing 
that “[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, 
knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that 
causes injury to a human being”). 
  11. 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding state-court enforcement of restrictive covenants 
unconstitutional). 
  12. Fairchild v. Raines, 151 P.2d 260 (1944) (declining to enforce restrictive covenant 
due to changed character of neighborhood); see also id. at 267 (Traynor, J., concurring) 
(“In my opinion the findings of the trial court . . . also fail to consider whether enforcement 
[of restrictive covenants based on race] would be contrary to the public interest in the use 
of land in urban communities where people are concentrated in limited areas”). 
  13. Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 29 (Cal.1948) (Traynor, J.) (also reported as Perez v. 
Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711 (1948)) (holding that California’s anti-miscegenation statutes 
“violate[d] the equal protection of the laws clause of the United States Constitution by 
impairing the right of individuals to marry on the basis of race alone and by arbitrarily and 
unreasonably discriminating against certain racial groups”). 
  14. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).  
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criminal law, as well, in the areas of diminished capacity15 and 
the exclusionary rule.16 In its twenty-four years the Gibson 
Court set the table for Justice Traynor’s elevation to Chief 
Justice in 1964. 
E. Chapter Five: 1964–1987 
This long chapter is the heart of the book, and a small 
masterpiece of legal historical writing. Written by the book’s 
editor, Harry N. Scheiber, it plays out like a Greek tragedy. The 
hubris may have begun with the Traynor Court’s six more years 
of Gibson-like leadership. Then followed seven years under 
Chief Justice Donald Wright, who Governor Ronald Reagan 
later described as his “worst appointment”17 when referring to 
the California Supreme Court decision that first held the state’s 
death penalty unconstitutional.18
In 1977 came Governor Jerry Brown’s controversial 
appointment of Chief Justice Rose Bird. In the nine-year period 
thereafter, nemeses accumulated in the form of reaction to the 
Court’s consistent overturning of death-penalty verdicts. This 
culminated in the removal of Bird and two Associate Justices in 
the retention election of 1986. Not all of the opposition to Bird 
was Republican or arch-conservative. But through the period, 
politics—including party politics—impinged on the Court’s 
activity to a major degree. This was not surprising: California in 
the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s was not the stable, predictably 
  15.  See, e.g., People v. Conley, 411 P.2d 911 (Cal. 1966) (Traynor, C.J.) (assessing 
diminished-capacity defense in context of People v. Wells, 202 P.2d 53 (1949), superseded 
by statute as recognized in, e.g., People v. Saille, 820 P.2d 588, 592 (Cal. 1991) 
(recognizing in addition that Wells had by 1991 itself been disapproved)). 
  16. People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955), superseded by constitutional amendment,
as recognized in In re Lance W., 694 P.2d 744, 752 (Cal. 1985) (en banc) (explaining that 
then-recent change in State Constitution left state exclusionary rule intact, but 
“eliminate[d] a judicially created remedy for violations of the search and seizure provisions 
of the federal or state Constitutions, through the exclusion of evidence so obtained, except 
to the extent that exclusion remains federally compelled” (emphasis in original)). 
  17. Former California Chief Justice Who Angered Reagan Dies, UNITED PRESS INT’L
(Mar. 22, 1985), http://www.upi.com/Archives/1985/03/22/Former-California-Chief-Justice 
-who-angered-Reagan-dies/8541480315600/ (noting that Reagan “called Wright his ‘worst 
appointment’”).
  18. See People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972) (en banc), superseded by 
constitutional amendment, as recognized in, e.g., People v. Hill, 839 P.2d 984, 1017 (Cal. 
1992).
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liberal state that it now appears to be. Politically it was all over 
the place. By contrast the Court, even in the Wright years, was 
decidedly, even stubbornly, liberal. 
It would be tempting, writing about this period, to focus 
entirely on the death penalty, which was certainly the principal 
bone of contention. But Professor Scheiber covers it all, 
including the fascinating (to scholars, at least) issue of 
independent and adequate state grounds, which the Court used to 
try to shield its rulings from the more conservative United States 
Supreme Courts that followed the Warren Court. 
F. Chapter Six: 1987–1996 
For some reason, the writers carved off the term of Chief 
Justice Malcolm Lucas into a separate chapter. Far better would 
have been a Chapter Five on Traynor and Wright, followed by 
Chapter Six on Bird and Lucas. This is because the transition 
from Bird to Lucas was the most important aspect of the latter’s 
term. In a wink, with the removal of three liberal Justices and 
their replacement with three conservative ones, the Court should 
have become staunchly right wing. Yet that did not happen, or 
not entirely. 
Lucas had for three years been an almost invisible member 
of the Bird Court. After 1986, as Chief, he came to the fore, and 
was a very active writer of opinions. But the new Court’s only 
important legacy was to reverse the trend established by the Bird 
Court with regard to the death penalty.19 Aside from that, not 
much new law was made. As this chapter puts it, the Lucas 
Court’s aim seemed to be “retrenchment, not revolution.”20
G. Chapter Seven: 1996–2010 
This chapter ends the book on a high note, from the 
appointment of Ronald George as Chief through his fourteen 
years in office. George was a highly competent Justice and a 
brilliant administrator. His Court had to wrestle with the ballot- 
  19. See Gerald F. Uelmen, The Lucas Legacy, CAL. LAW., May 1996, at 29 (explaining 
that “[u]nder Lucas, ‘harmless error’ became a mantra, as the court dramatically lowered 
the level of judicial, prosecutorial, and defender competence demanded in capital cases”). 
  20. GOVERNANCE AND POWER, supra note *, at 550. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE AND JUDICIAL POWER 111
initiative law many times, and did a good job overall. Much of 
this had to do with the premier hot-button issue of the time, 
marriage equality. The California electorate performed an 
amazing policy U-turn between 2004, when this issue first came 
before the Court,21 and 2010, the end of George’s incumbency. 
George, appointed by a Republican, was a centrist in just about 
every way, and led the Court through a stormy period, and out of 
it, with its reputation, and thus its power, largely intact. 
III. THE JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHIES
The book is replete with capsule biographies of certain 
Justices, as it naturally would be. The job of writing those 
biographies was made easier in Chapters One through Four 
because of an earlier work that contains biographies of all the 
Justices who sat on the Court between 1850 and 1950.22 This 
debt is indicated by the frequent citations to that work here, but 
it was produced in the mid-1960s. Since then, a new volume 
covering Justices who were on the Court after 1950 has been 
needed, but has not been produced. The biographical 
information about more recent Justices in this comprehensive 
history of the Court goes some way toward filling that gap. 
IV. THE AUTHORS AND THE EDITOR
Half of the writers here are affiliated in some way with the 
University of California–Berkeley. Others have ties to Stanford. 
And one, Gordon Bakken, formerly at California State 
University–Fullerton, was the author of two seminal volumes on 
law, and law practice, in frontier California.23 Sadly, Professor 
Bakken became ill and died during the development of the book. 
  21. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 184 (2008), superseded by statute as recognized in 
Horton v. Hollingsworth, 207 P.3d 48 (2009). Of course, the decision in Horton was itself 
eventually abrogated by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. 
Hodges, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  
  22. See generally II HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES OF CALIFORNIA, 1900–
1950 (J. Edward Johnson ed., 1966); I HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES OF 
CALIFORNIA, 1850–1900 (J. Edward Johnson ed., 1963).  
  23. See generally GORDON MORRIS BAKKEN, PRACTICING LAW IN FRONTIER
CALIFORNIA (1991); GORDON MORRIS BAKKEN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW IN 
FRONTIER CALIFORNIA (1985). 
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Still, his contribution, Chapter Two, is excellent and does not 
display any negative effects of that unfortunate event.24
Which brings us back to the editor, Professor Scheiber. His 
authorship of the terrific Chapter Five has been noted. Praise is 
due as well for the editing of a volume which, not only because 
of the number of authors, but also because of the time scope of 
the work, must have been a challenging job. One evidence of the 
quality of that work may be found in the many references in text 
to the downstream effect of certain decisions of the Court, when 
such effects took place in a later era, or in the prefiguring of 
certain decisions in the precedents set by the Court acting in an 
era set in an earlier segment of the book. That must not have 
been an easy task. 
V. ON THE OTHER HAND . . .
A few nits. The index is large and contains listings of the 
Court’s more important decisions, but a table of cases cited 
would have made the book more valuable as a future go-to 
reference. Moreover, a single paperbound volume of well over 
600 pages is just too large for easy handling and for resistance to 
wear and tear. Two volumes would have been better, at least for 
the paperbound version.25
And one big criticism. The authors do a good job of 
relating important events in, and aspects of, the California 
Supreme Court’s relations to that other Supreme Court—the one 
in Washington, D.C. Surprisingly, however, little to nothing is 
included about the Ninth Circuit, or indeed about the four 
federal district courts in California. The federal system has 
always, throughout the life of the California Supreme Court, 
existed as a parallel avenue for litigation. Forum shopping by 
litigants who preferred the federal courts meant that some issues 
never reached the California Supreme Court, even when it might 
be argued that they should have. The premier example of this 
  24. A personal note: years ago, Professor Bakken kindly helped this author gain access to 
the restricted precincts of the Rare Books and Manuscripts collections of the Huntington 
Library in San Marino, California. 
  25. The book was issued in both hardcover and paperbound versions, see Constitutional 
Governance and Judicial Power, CAL. SUP. CT. HISTORICAL SOC’Y (n.d.), https://my.cschs 
.org/product/court-history-book (indicating that both versions are available).  
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was the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Mendez v. Westminster 
School District,26 the late-1940s school-segregation case that 
preceded and significantly prefigured the Brown27 decision 
seven years later. Because the Mendez plaintiffs decided to 
begin in federal court, and because the school districts and the 
state Department of Education decided not to appeal from the 
Ninth Circuit’s order, the school-desegregation issue never 
reached the California Supreme Court and the Mendez case itself 
never reached the United States Supreme Court. 
There were also times when important matters, such as 
Sarah Althea Hill’s claims against William Sharon that 
culminated in the death of Justice Terry,28 flowed through both 
the state and federal systems,29 seriously impacting the 
outcomes in each. And this sort of parallel progress meant on 
occasion that the federal outcome overshadowed the work of the 
California Supreme Court, as was the case with the federal 
courts’ 1880s rulings in its North Bloomfield Gravel-Mining 
Company cases.30 These were decided at about the same time as 
the California Supreme Court’s rulings on hydraulic mining and 
the destruction of downstream environments,31 but were of 
greater impact on actual events thereafter. In recent years the 
California Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have continued 
to be active in the same areas of law, and in so doing have 
sometimes created conflicting lines of precedent. Given that the 
two courts, despite having a greatly overlapping geographic 
  26. 64 F. Supp. 544 (S. D. Cal. 1946), aff’d, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947).  
  27. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
  28. See text accompanying note 3, supra. The Hill-Sharon saga included a high-profile 
politician, a socialite, an alleged secret marriage, substantial amounts of cash, at least one 
extramarital affair, a fortune-teller, and—eventually—a diagnosis of insanity. See
generally, e.g., Edmund W. Pugh, A California Drama, 21 ABA J. 351 (June 1935); The
Tragic History of the Sharon Cases, in HISTORY OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF CALIFORNIA
173 (Oscar T. Shuck ed., 1901). 
  29. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890) (ending federal-court litigation); 
Sharon v. Sharon, 23 P. 1100 (Cal. 1890) (ending state-court litigation). 
  30. See, e.g., N. Bloomfield Gravel-Mining Co. v. United States, 88 F. 664 (9th C.C. 
1898) (addressing the dumping and discharge of mining debris). 
  31. See, e.g., N. Bloomfield Gravel Min. Co. v. Keyser, 58 Cal. 315 (1881) (addressing 
the dumping of mine tailings). 
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jurisdiction, are parts of two different systems, these conflicts 
have been hard to resolve.32
VI. A FINAL PERSONAL NOTE
In 2005 I started teaching a law school course in California 
legal history. The materials for that course were made from 
scratch, consuming untold professor-hours in the making. If this 
volume had existed twelve years ago, that burden would have 
been largely removed. But, at least we have it now, and that is a 
good thing. 
  32. Two examples are the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate in areas in which the 
parties have unequal bargaining power, see, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Healthcare Servs., 
Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000), abrogated by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, ___ U.S. 
___, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding, in case originating in the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of California, that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts California 
decisions on unconscionability of class arbitration waivers), and the enforcement of post-
employment covenants not to compete, as the California Supreme Court generally enforces 
the state’s restraint-of-trade statute more completely than do the federal courts. 
